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Abstract 
 
The field of hate crime research addresses the presence, sources and impact of particular 
types of expressions of prejudice, often perceived as particularly damaging and hurtful 
forms of interpersonal abuse and violence. Little, if any, credible academic research seeks 
to vindicate the specific racist, gendered and other vicious prejudices articulated by many 
perpetrators of hate crime. In turn, this raises the reflexive question of the possibilities of 
researchers themselves ever being able to adopt a truly "unprejudiced" approach to the 
presence of such damaging prejudices. Can this goal be realised without a researcher 
necessarily losing an experientially-grounded understanding of what these meanings, 
values and purposes have come to mean, and how they are themselves interpretatively 
re-constituted anew, including within the lived experience of victims, witnesses, police, 
prosecutors, judges and victim support workers?  
   A possible philosophically-informed approach to the dilemmas posed by this topic is 
offered by Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's perpetually unfinished philosophical 
methodology strives, with concerted if sometimes tragic reflective rigor, to "suspend," 
"bracket out" and "neutralise" those core presuppositions constitutive of the research field 
that typically pre-judge precisely whatever demands to be questioned and explored in a 
radically non-prejudicial manner. This study critically explores the possibilities, reflective 
stages and theoretical limitations of a sympathetically reconstructed Husserlian approach 
to hate crime, itself understood as a would-be qualitative "science of consciousness." It 
argues that despite its manifest tensions, gaps, ambiguities and internal contradictions, 
aspects of the Husserlian philosophical approach directed towards the different levels of 
 2 
experienced hate crime still retain the potential to both challenge and advance our 
understanding of this topic. It is the "instructive" part of "instructive failure" that this article 
highlights. 
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'The first thing we must do ... is to take the conscious life completely without prejudice.' 
Edmund Husserl1 
 
  
 
Introduction 
Many scholars and contributors to studies on the criminal justice system have recognised a 
discrepancy between formalistic doctrinal, law and economics or jurisprudential analysis 
of a given topic, and evidence of how these topics are actually being subjectively lived, 
experiencedand interpreted , including by victims of crime, lawyers, judges, victim support 
workers, and lay persons affected by such criminality.2 Sometimes the complaint is that 
                                                 
1
 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern 
Univ. Pr. 1970, 233. 
2
 The phenomenological concept or experience (more precisely experience of the category of experience signifying the 
self-givenness of objects to express or tacit consciousness) is complex. See Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 
Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973, 27-28, 331-333; Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to 
a Phenomenological Philosophy - Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, 1989. R. Rojcewicz and 
A. Schuwer, translators. Dordrecht: Kluwer; Husserliana: Phänomenologische Psychologie Vorlesungen 
Sommersemester 1925 Volume 9 of Husserliana: gesammelte Werke, Archives Husserl à Louvain, Springer 2010; Zur 
Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat: Texte aus dem Nachlass Zweiter Teil, 1921-1928, editor Iso Kern, Springer, 
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legal analysis, even that of human rights scholarship, is grounded upon an overlay of 
superimposed premises and specialist modes of discourse. Without good reason, these tend 
to disregard both the lived-experience of the situation in question, and the lay concerns and 
social interests that first generated this as a research theme.3 
   We would argue that a Husserlian type of phenomenological analysis, grounded within 
Husserl’s middle and later works, is especially applicable to hate crimes because of its 
systematic and philosophically informed and rigorous interrogation of the lived experience 
of such crimes precisely as they are being subjectively encountered. The very term “hate 
crime” is often deployed in an extremely loose and unreflective manner. That is, as a 
shorthand term for almost any expression or act to which a discriminatory motivation is 
being ascribed, and without addressing questions of definition. Given the focus of 
Husserlian phenomenology on the systematic recovery of unreflectively “lived through” 
experiences whose meanings are largely taken for granted, a phenomenological approach is 
particularly useful as a corrective both to the “natural attitude” of everyday life and to other 
scholarly approaches that gloss over the meanings of such experiential data, or even the 
data itself. Of course, Husserlian such analysis could and should be applied to other forms 
of experienced criminality4 and subjective encounter with the legal system more 
                                                                                                                                                 
2013. 
3
 William E. Conklin, 'Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey of Semiotics and Phenomenology,' 27 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 129 (1995-1996). 
4
 Here we are thinking of the works of R.Meek, ‘The experiences of a young Gypsy-Traveller in the transition from 
custody to community: An interpretative phenomenological analysis’ Legal and Criminological Psychology, Volume 
12, Issue 1, pages 133–147, February 2007; Rosie Meek, ‘Experiences of Younger Siblings of Young Men in Prison,’ 
Children & Society, 2008, 22, 4. 5; M.Salter, ‘Judicial Responses To Football Hooliganism’, Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, Vol. 37, No.3, Autumn 1986, 280-292; McGruder, Karen Elizabeth. "Some potential contributions of a 
phenomenological approach to crime." PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 1996; Boeff, Dismas Raymond. 
"Phenomenological criminology and the Catholic correctional chaplaincy." PhD diss., Sam Houston State University, 
1986;D.Matza, Becoming Deviant, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Publishers, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1969);D.Matza, 
Delinquency and Drift, ( Transaction Publishers, 1964); Katz, Jack. Seductions of crime: Moral and sensual attractions 
in doing evil. Basic Books, 1988; Cicourel, Aaron Victor, The social organization of juvenile justice, Transaction 
Books, 1995. 
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generally,5 and indeed there is an established literature on phenomenological approaches 
to state regulation through law in general.6 Although a Husserlian account could be 
applied to other areas of the criminology such as domestic violence and sex crimes, we 
would argue that this approach is especially insightful for hate crime research given the 
frequent lack of phenomenological sensibility and rigor - even within qualitative studies 
that are broadly interpretative.   There are forms of academic analysis that re-arrange 
value-loaded ideas with conceptions that are clearly far removed from the intuited contents 
of lived experience. Such research develops their critiques from "on high," rather than upon 
the basis of an insider's firsthand knowledge of the topic itself acquired through 
ethnographic and/or qualitative research into its presence to the consciousness of 
participants and affected parties.7 
   In response to these problems, critics have called for the adoption of an expressly 
experiential, or "phenomenological," approach as a remedy for this discrepancy.8 Edmund 
Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenological theory and research methodology, has 
argued that, in order for any type of natural or social science to 'begin at all,' that is, before 
any theorising about specific topics can even occur, a major condition must be fulfilled. 
                                                 
5
 M.Salter, "Towards A Programme Of Foundational Legal Research", Journal Of The British Society For 
Phenomenology', (JBSP) Vol. 19, No.2, May 1988, 250-258; M.Salter, ‘A Dialectic Despite Itself? Overcoming the 
Phenomenology of Legal Culture’ S.& L.S. [Social and Legal Studies, Sage], 1995, 4(4), 453-476. 
6
 See four works by Michael Salter and collaborators: ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Legal Thinking’, Journal Of The 
British Society For Phenomenology (JBSP) Vol. 23, No.2, 1992, 167-182; ‘Common Sense and the Resistance to Legal 
Theory’, Ratio Juris, Vol. 5, No.2, July 1992: 212-229; ‘On Heidegger's Account of Interpretation’, New Comparisons, 
No.17 , Spring 1994, 150-169; ‘On the Idea of a Legal World’, Int 'I Jnl of the Legal Profession, Vol.1, Winter 1994, 
283- 310. 
7
 This is not to deny that phenomenological analysis itself involves the interpretive activity of structuring research 
materials, such as firsthand reports, interview transcripts, notes from direct participant observation. It is rather to 
emphasise the distinction between developing an optimal form of receptivity and responsiveness to qualitative data on 
the one hand, and the prejudicial force-fitting of such materials into given, fixed and pre-conceived categories on the 
other, particularly in ways that pre-empt these materials  from ever becoming radically questioned, modified or 
experientially-grounded. 
8
 Augusto Balloni, for example, calls for the study of the experience of victims 'in the broadest possible sense of the term.' 
Augusto Balloni, 'Victims, Crimes, and Social Context,' in Critical Issues in Victimology: International Perspectives, 
Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992: 17, 22; I. F. Caramazza and U. Leone, Phenomenology of Kidnappings in Sardinia: Towards 
an International Perspective of a Local Crime Problem, The United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, Rome, 
Italy: 1984. 
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Namely, that researchers ought first secure an in-depth qualitative awareness of the 
particular type of objects and themes that make up the distinctive fields of research in 
question: one that is grounded in the intuitive evidence of firsthand lived-experience.9 It is 
first necessary, Husserl claimed, to establish the meaning and scope of founding categories. 
For instance, the meaning and scope of the "juris" of jurisprudence, the "social" of 
sociology, the "psyche" of psychology, the "physical" of physics, the "life/bio" of biology, 
the “criminality” of "hate crime," etc.10 In other words, to elucidate founding categories 
that might otherwise remain taken for granted even by expert researchers. 
  What can it mean to develop a distinctly "experiential-phenomenological" research 
project into hate crime, drawing upon the philosophy underpinning Husserlian 
phenomenological theory, and involving a sequence of stages and levels of analysis, each 
building upon accumulated results of earlier phases?11 Provisionally, this can be 
understood as a type of research programme that clearly shows how it is possible to take 
seriously and analyse different aspects of the "lived-experience" of hate crime. Here, such 
experience, saturated with relations of meaning, value and purpose, needs to be treated as a 
topic demanding attention and close analysis purely in its own right and - as far as possible 
- on its own terms.12 Phenomenology does not analyse, say, the experience of hate crime in 
                                                 
9
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 10-11; 46-53. For the present authors earlier efforts to adapt the philosophy underpinning 
Husserlian phenomenology to the demands of conducting research on legal topics, see Salter, M., ‘On The Beginnings 
of Foundational Legal Research Into Legal Discourse,’ Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 9, No.1, April 1987, 23-43; Salter, 
M., 'Towards a Programme of Foundational Legal Research," Journal of the British Society For Phenomenology,' Vol. 
19, No.2, May 1988, 250-258. 
10
 Husserl's work Experience and Judgment, Northwestern Univ Press, Evanston, 1973 also provides a most useful 
basis for developing and refining a distinctly experiential approach to law. 
11
 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, 10. Phenomenology, as a philosophical-theoretic 
methodology, was established by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and his approach, as extended by his successor, Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976), was extremely influential within continental Europe during the 20th century, especially 
Germany. It's influence was extended into postwar France by Simone Goyard-Fabre, Paul Amselek (1937-- ), and 
Jean-Louis Gardies (1905-), but without making any comparable impact within the English-speaking world. Its take up 
within Anglo-American legal studies has been patchy.  
12
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 125-6. Again such immersion and submission to the lessons exhibited by qualitative data does 
not deny either a relation of dialogue between the researcher's own interpretive framework and the research topic, or the 
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a manner that presupposes an already given type of "solution" or policy response (based, 
e.g., on free-market or socialist ideological premises) to which the researcher was already 
committed from the start. Hence, its policy-oriented practical implications stem from a 
process of discovery, not the self-fulfilling vindication of the researcher's own 
superimposed prejudices. 
   In terms of traditional theoretical oppositions and distinctions, such experiential 
research has to be qualitative and interpretative in nature, as opposed to quantitative and 
positivist-causal.13 That is, it makes no effort to generate and analyse official statistical 
data to provide a "causal explanation" of hate crime incidents reinterpreted in naturalistic 
terms of "behaviour," and in relation to, say, changing levels and distributions of 
unemployment, social deprivation or other alleged "social variables" taken as "causes" of 
different patterns of hate crime.14 Nor does it rely upon the premises of either deductive or 
inductive logic, and thus: 'does not theorise or carry out mathematical operations; that is to 
say; it does not carry through any explanations in the sense of deductive theory.'15 
   Husserlian phenomenology thus opposes a "naturalistic" approach to hate crime for 
which this topic is treated simply as part of material nature, a concept that subsumes even 
the conscious life of those involved or affected by this activity.16 When interpreted in a 
naturalistic manner, hate crime would have to be analysed by means of natural-scientific 
methods, including a materialist form of psychology or sociology, oriented toward given 
                                                                                                                                                 
selectivity involved in questioning, selecting and interpreting it - a point tackled later in this paper.  
13
 Husserl, Ideas, W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., 1982, 33-51, 135-7; Husserl, 1970 op cit, 135-7, 215-19. 
14
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 221-24; Husserl, 1964 op cit, 4-5, 20-21, 46. The fact that deep seated assumptions have been 
given statistical form, and can thereby be expressed with exactitude and through statistics, graphs, charts etc., does not 
prevent them from being problematic for Husserl. 
15
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 5, 16. 
16
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 5-11, part 2. 
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empirical facts and causal explanations of relevant factual situations.17 Whilst expressly 
phenomenological studies of hate crime are rare indeed, it is arguably that existing research 
includes a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Hence the Husserlian 
critique is more directly relevant only to that sub-set of positivistic, causal studies that rely 
naively upon official statistics as expressing “hard data.” However, the level of 
methodological reflection and rigor displayed by the existing qualitative studies could, we 
suggest, still be substantially upgraded through a critical engagement with Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
   In addition to faithfully investigating and describing particular experiences of affected 
parties in their distinctiveness, meaningfulness and diversity, 18  a Husserlian 
phenomenological approach also analyses a number of those core structures, general 
patterns and principles that can be found within, or - as deep-seated structures - underlie, 
such experiences. 19 These typically govern their "appearance" within the experiential 
realm in various interesting ways. 20  Here, we can, following Husserl, take a factual 
scenario that has already been successfully prosecuted under UK legislation as a 
“disability-related hate crime,” and then ask the following analytical questions: Which of 
its features appears to be operating as "essential preconditions" for its identification and 
legal interpretation as a hate crime of this particular sub-category and a “hate crime” more 
generally. Secondly, which of the experienced qualities of this instance of a 
disability-related hate crime appear to be "optional," such that their absence in any 
particular reported case would not have affected this classification in either one way or the 
                                                 
17
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 61-67, 211-13. 
18
 Husserl, 1973 op cit, 253, 264-71. 
19
 Husserl, 1973 op cit, 339-348; Husserl, 1964 op cit, 6-7. 
20
 Husserl, 1982 op cit, 156-64; Husserl, 1964 op cit, 41-2. 
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other. For example, the hair colour, height and age or gender of the victim in question. And, 
finally, what other potential features had they been identified as present would have 
undermined the very possibility of this interpretive classification? For example, if an 
assault occurred on someone with a hidden disability not apparent to the perpetrator. 
Would the absence of perceived disability transform what could be identified as "a 
disability related hate crime " into merely a "simple  assault" for example?21 Equally, 
perception of low-level’ targeted harassment as anti-social behaviour, rather than targeted 
‘hate crime’ transforms the recording and prosecution of a crime.  
   Categories define what can be ‘seen’ as a hate crime. Gender-bias is a ‘hate crime’ in 
twenty- seven US states,22 but not in the UK. Therefore, crimes expressly committed 
because of bias against, for example, females, in the UK, will not be classified as ‘hate 
crimes’. The case of Levi Bellfield is indicative: according to police and media reports 
Levi‘... spoke of ‘hatred’ and ‘intense loathing’ of women; a former girlfriend described 
how he had confessed that he would wait in alleyways wanting to: "hurt, kill, stab or rape 
women.” 23  Long argues,’... if  Bellfield’s hate-motivated violence had been directed at 
victims on the basis of their perceived race, religion or belief, sexual orientation, disability 
or transgender identity, his crimes would clearly have been recognised as hate crimes.'24  
For Husserl, this structural type of analysis is only possible once the more descriptive 
phase of experiential research has been completed. He termed it "eidetic analysis" - from 
                                                 
21
 Husserl, 1982 op cit, 8-14. 
22
  For empirical studies into reasons for and against the inclusion of gender in US : McPhail. B.A. & DiNitto. D.M,  
‘Prosecutorial perspectives on gender-bias hate crimes’ [2005] Violence Against Women, 11(9), 1162-1185: Hodge, 
2011 op.cit. 
23
 See Julia Long 30 November 2010 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/julia-long/should-violence-against-women-in-the-uk-be-seen-as-hate-crime 
accessed 18/2/13.  Bellfield was convicted of murdering  3 females, and of ‘attempted murder’ of another. 
24
  Ibid. 
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"eidos" or "essence."25 It is a research method that can be used when answering each of the 
four main questions that comprise an overall phenomenological approach to any topic, and 
which are discussed in detail by the following subsections.   
 
Four Main Questions  
There are four main research questions posed by a Husserlian phenomenological approach 
concerned with the basic structures of lived experience. The first questions the very starting 
position and aims of its own experiential research, partly by seeking to set aside more 
conventional positivist premises that are linked to the philosophy of materialism and 
materialistic "explanations."26 Husserlian analysis asks: by means of which cluster, or 
sequence, of research methods is it possible to gain appropriate access to the lived 
experience of hate crime sufficient to overcome the difficulties that bedevil more 
conventional ways of conducting research into hate crime? Here, we could point to 
phenomenological methods of ethnographic research and participant observation involving 
the researcher’s immersion in the experiential “life worlds” of those involved in, or 
affected in various ways by, hate crime or engaged in implementing law-related 
institutional responses to such criminality. Other less direct methods include focus groups, 
and semi-structured interviews with such participants designed to uncover relevant lived 
experiences and how these are being routinely interpreted.27 
   Must researchers uncritically adopt and apply stereotypes, forming part of taken for 
                                                 
25
 Husserl, 1973 op cit, 337ff. 
26
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 65-68. 
27
 A qualitative phenomenological methodology has been developed by the “Duquesne School” of The Descriptive 
Phenomenological Method in Psychology), including by Amedeo Giorgi and Frederick Wertz. See Giorgi, Amedeo. 
(2009), The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology. Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, PA; an d 
Wertz, F. J. (2005). ‘Phenomenological research methods for counseling psychology,’ Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 52(2), 167-177 
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granted interpretations or official policy assumptions and statistics, as their starting 
point?28 Alternatively, do they as Husserl insists, need - as far as humanly possible, and 
subject to limitations clarified during later stages of phenomenological analysis, to actively 
suspend (or "neutralise," "disengage" and "bracket out") these assumption-rich starting 
points in order to begin experientially-grounded research?29 Is such an optimal possible, if 
necessarily incomplete, suspension of presuppositions needed to allow a more complete 
and less distorted understanding of the topic to gradually emerge?30 
   Phenomenology is critical in that its opening methodological devices strives as far as 
humanly possible to suspend and neutralise whatever is ideologically taken for granted 
about hate crime, and whatever constitutes an "appropriate" policy response to it. In 
practice, only an approximation of complete suspension will ever be possible.31 Instead of 
simply accepting a given meaning and its presupposed validity as intrinsic to the given 
transcendent nature of hate crime as such, to its sheer matter-of-fact "thatness," 
phenomenological methodology places the validity of these meanings into question; it does 
so to better establish an experientially-grounded interpretation.32 There is the demand not 
to be deceived by taking interpretations founded upon traditional assumptions "on trust," 
and, therefore, to treat as claims to knowledge what conventionally pass as "obvious" 
                                                 
28Alfred Schutz, "Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation in Human Action." In Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. (1953).14: 1-38; and Alfred Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy." In Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. (1959) 20: 147-165. Schultz’s category of typification implies that stereotyping is a 
sub-set of a more general process of viewing particular topics of experience through general categories or types, but 
that not all typication involves the negative connotation of unreflective and stereotyping of the kind common to hate 
speech and hate crime. 
29
 Husserl, 1982 op cit, 5-7, 51-60, 63-7. 
30
 Husserl, 1973 op cit, 41-47; Husserl, 1970 op cit, 233. Here, there is also a need to acknowledge the limitations of 
this effort of purging of prejudice, and open acknowledgment that the subjectivity and orientation of phenomenological 
researchers is also in continual process of construction/reconstruction in various phenomenologically interesting ways 
soon to be discussed, albeit one that tries to take its clue from the topic. 
31
 Richard Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology: Criticism as a Philosophical Discipline, New York, 1970 46-8; John 
O’Neil, 'Can phenomenology be critical?' 2 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1972: 1-13, 1. This essay is also 
contained in in Thomas Luckman, ed., Phenomenology and Sociology, Penguin, 1968. 
32
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 38-9. 
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common sense knowledge.33 The wider goal is to break free of the deep moorings of 
routine acceptance the status quo as a matter of course, in which whatever exists is taken 
for granted precisely because "that is the way it is," or "that's life" or other dubious 
rationalisation such as "human nature." 
   Indeed, deploying unambiguous language, Husserl himself insisted that: 'the task ... is, 
first of all, a critical one.'34 For him, critical analysis is not merely one among many other 
characteristics and goals of phenomenological research, whose adoption or rejection is 
strictly optional. On the contrary, if phenomenological research were ever to abandon its 
critical and questioning stance, its treating as problematic that which is being ideologically 
promoted as self-evidently true, then it would be left with 'no sensible objectives' 
whatsoever.35 Even at the very start of concrete research, a phenomenological critique is 
necessary to "loosen up" elements of complacency of a self-evident and all-too easily 
self-satisfied cultural traditions shaped decisively by the presuppositions of naive realism, 
naturalism and positivism. The challenge here is to both dissolve and reconnect this 
tradition's basic concepts with the original, or "raw," pre-linguistic experiences and 
experiential structures from which they originate, but which have become buried.36 
   Should researchers seek to answer "why-type" questions that supposedly explain (or 
perhaps more critically "explain away") this topic in a manner using a "cause and effect" 
model of analysis rooted in a certain 19th and early 20th Century model of natural science? 
If not, as phenomenologists insist for various interesting reasons, should we adopt an 
                                                 
33
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 4. 
34
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 17. 
35
 Husserl 1964, 2. 
36
 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, NY: State University of New York Press; Revised edition 2010, para. 6. This is, I 
would emphasise, is a reference to realties as concretely lived and experienced in terms of their what and how, not to 
transcendent, extra-experiential realities per se. 
 12 
approach that is more expressly interpretative and qualitative in nature?37 If so, then what 
does this methodological and philosophical commitment actually mean in practice for 
conducting an applied project on the lived experience of hate crime? Is a strictly qualitative 
"explanation" of hate crime a contradiction in terms? Or, does adopting Husserl's 
phenomenological approach to the conduct of research on this topic demand a different and 
distinctly interpretative-hermeneutical type of "explanation": an explanation where one's 
consciousness of hate crime as something experienced is accounted for in terms of the 
("transcendental") sense-making dynamics and activities of consciousness itself.38 These 
include the interests, concerns and orientations of different individuals and wider 
communities of interpreters located within various intersubjective "life-worlds?"39 If so, 
then is the idea of a "science of consciousness of phenomena," or phenomeno-logy, able to 
demonstrate, contrary to a range of theoretical objections, that it remains a viable project? 
To answer these methodological questions requires us to clarify a series of levels of 
analysis, each of which poses a distinct type of questions asked in a necessary sequence: 
what-type, how-type and for-whom type questions.  
   In terms of qualitative content, or "sense," Husserlian phenomenology asks the 
what-question: i.e., what is it that is being commonly experienced as a "hate crime" both 
generally and in terms of specific subcategories or "types"?40 In opposition to all 
naturalistic approaches, this level of phenomenological analysis of hate crime turns directly 
to the evidence of lived experience of this topic. It describing and elucidates how this 
                                                 
37
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 230-32. 
38
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 35: This is an explanation of basic concepts and propositions which function as principles 
governing the possibility of all conceivable scientific and other interpretations and explanations of hate crime, together 
- at a later stage - with a similar type of explanation of phenomenology's own categories and principles, including 
qualitative forms of explanation. Ibid, 46. 
39
 Husserl, 1973 op cit, 41-52; Husserl, 1970 op cit, 48-53, 121-132. For a transposition and application of the concept 
of life-world into the specifically legal sub-sphere of society, see Salter, M.,‘On the Idea of a Legal World’, Int'l Jnl of 
the Legal Profession, Vol.1, Winter 1994, 283- 310. 
40
 Husserl, 1970 op cit, 241. 
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"takes shape" within the first person subjective life of those who have different types of 
involvement and engagement with this phenomenon.41 Phenomenology thereby takes 
advantage of the fact that consciousness is, by its very nature, potentially open to aspects of 
itself through inwardly directed acts of reflection that seize upon and grasp the streaming 
flux of its own interpretative acts and their contents.42 In place of causal-naturalistic 
"explanations," a phenomenology of hate crime provides richly descriptive elucidations of 
the interconnectedness and correlation of processes of "experiencing" and whatever is 
being subjectively experienced and interpreted as a hate crime, or as a hate incident. In 
other words, the focus of this type of research falls upon the best ways of gaining access to, 
and then faithfully describing, clarifying and distinguishing, the meaning that being 
involved in a hate crime incident can and does exhibit for affected and involved parties.43 
As Husserl notes: 'Phenomenology proceeds by "seeing," clarifying, and determining 
meaning, and distinguishing meanings. It compares, it distinguishes, it forms connections, 
it puts into relation, divides into parts, or divides abstract aspects.'44 As important, such 
elucidation and analysis can succeed in uncovering interpretive conditions of the 
possibility of such experience.45 
   The overall goal of such qualitative phenomenological research at this what-level is to 
make the "phenomena" of hate crime, that is, the presence of this topic to the consciousness 
of different individuals who experience and interpret it as something meant, as intelligible 
as possible. The same point applies to the relationship within the overall research field 
                                                 
41
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 10. 
42
 Husserl, 1982 op cit, 78-80; Husserl, 1964 op cit, 1. This is not to deny the role of external validation by others, but 
only to insist that, without such potential openness to sustained self-reflection, phenomenological analysis would be 
impossible. 
43
 Husserl, 1982 op cit, 151-6; See 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/disabled_people_s_experiences_of_targeted_violence_an
d_hostility.pdf 
44
 Husserl, 1964 op cit, 46. 
45
 Ibid. Husserl, 1964 op cit, 1. 
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between the central topic and other related themes.46 This involves making a concerted 
effort to enhance our understanding of the far-reaching impact and ramifications of such 
criminality on those directly and indirectly involved and affected by their experience of it. 
This includes witnesses, as well as officials charged with responding to reported incidents, 
and others involved with specifically legal and policy dimensions of this issue, such as 
legislators, judges, prosecutors and police officers. 
   Ideally, but subject to practical limitations addressed below, the what-question is posed 
from the perspective of a 'fully "disinterested" spectator' whose purely cognitive interest 
lies in securing whatever answer to issues concerning hate crime best fits the available 
experiential evidence.47 The goal is to gain access, describe and elucidate consciousness of 
this topic just as it immediately presents itself, as itself, to be.48 Taken purely as given 
perceptually, what meanings are being routinely ascribed to hate incidents within the 
everyday life-worlds of affected parties and those who have official responsibilities for 
responding to such incidents?49 Here, legal definitions contained in both statutes but also 
within case law decisions need to be identified, distinguished and analysed in terms of their 
meaning, scope and rationale.  
   However, from a phenomenological standpoint, such "official understandings" - 
operating from the "top down" as were - also need to be counterbalanced by the 
interpretations of others working at the grassroots level of everyday life, including victims, 
witnesses and perpetrators of hate crimes.50 In this way, Husserlian analysis also operates 
from the "bottom up," as it were, viewing officially defined and interpreted realities related 
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to hate crime incidents from the perspective of everyday life as lived and experienced from 
the "ground up" as element of subjective and intersubjective "life-worlds."51 This requires 
securing many first-hand accounts of hate crime, and then elucidating both their 
distinctive, as well as shared qualities, including implicit as well as explicit elements of 
their lived significance. Here, the task is to elucidate what is given in the sense intuition of 
affected parties purely as it has been experienced as something meant without researchers 
superimposing prejudicial additions, subtractions or overlays of reinterpretation upon the 
topic itself.52 The concern is purely with the "whatness" of the lived experience in 
question, whilst remaining strictly agnostic concerning judgments about the "thatness" of 
whatever is being experienced (i.e., hate crime's extra-experiential presence and causes).53 
These actor accounts expressing interpretative understandings take shape as parts of a 
subjective-relative world in which the total communal life of efforts, concerns and 
accomplishments are realised through social action.54 Having been identified and their 
sense elucidated, their "whatness" as it were, these understandings of meaning, value and 
purpose, then need to be placed under a nexus of various sub-headings and headings 
devised to bring out the rich diversity of these experiences. 
   Experienced meanings, values and purposes are subject to a detailed elucidation and 
clarification of their sense-contents, their "whatness," to the point where these become 
increasingly distinct and optimally determinate. The distinctive character of meanings 
themselves, their form as ideal and immanent cultural entities exempted from natural 
qualities and vulnerabilities, such as physical destruction and burning, also becomes 
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increasingly apparent.55 So too does the differences between the interpretation of the 
meaning of hate incidents and the transcendent quality of these real incidents themselves.56 
At this point, further distinctions also become clearer, including in relation to the 
distinction between the ideal-cultural nature of meanings and whatever is genuinely 
"internal" to the contents of the streaming flux of interpretative acts of perception, 
recollection etc.57 
   The next theme, which presupposes the previous phase, is to address the specific 
manner of appearance of experienced hate crime, the multiplicities of modes of appearing 
and their interpretive structures, or "ways of being-directed-towards" this topic 
(understood technically as instances of "intentionality").58 Which modalities can we 
identify within the above descriptions of lived experience concerning the different 
"manners of appearance" of a given sense of hate crime? For example, the experience of a 
single episode can be variously interpreted by different parties called upon to interpret it for 
legal purposes as "definitively" a hate crime incident, or as a "probable", "possible" or 
"doubtful" incident of this kind.59 In turn, this interpretative dimension can change in the 
light of new evidence for example, or when interpreters "share notes" as it were, including 
perhaps a later disclosure of the attackers extensive prior criminal record for racist 
attacks.60 
   Following on from the above methodological phases addressing already constituted 
qualitative understandings of the meaning of hate crime together with their manner of 
subjective appearance, it is important to graduate from this what-level by asking "how 
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questions."61 Everything that is experienced as this type of criminality is encountered 
through a certain "mode of appearance," as something perceived, as recalled, anticipated, 
expressed etc.62 For Husserl, there is an essential correlation between what is perceived as 
hate crime and the interpretative act of perceiving it as such, and this correlation applies to 
other categories of interpretative act.63 
   The "whatness" of sense of real incidents "takes shape" within lived experience only 
within, and by means of, the ongoing performances of a certain modes of "interpretative 
act" and combination of these acts working in concert within the streaming inner flow of 
tacit and express consciousness.64 Everything experienced as part of a hate incident is thus 
encountered as an index of a subjective system of correlations for which it serves as a 
clue.65 For every perceived and recalled hate incident held to be subjectively valid and 
real, there is an underlying interpretative act of perceiving and recollection functioning as 
its correlate, and the same is true for acts of anticipation, imagination, judgment and 
linguistic expression.66 These concern the different underlying interpretative acts that, 
through an ongoing temporal synthesis, "put together" such established meanings, 
including hate crimes as perceived (presenting themselves and appearing through the mode 
of acts of perception), hate crimes as anticipated, as imagined, recalled and as expressed in 
words.67 Phenomenological analysis asks: from what interpretative factors are the 
ready-constituted meanings of hate crime built up, sustained and modified over time? What 
possibilities or combinations can be identified within their lived experience, and what 
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'geneal interrelations' are being exhibited?68 
   Each type of interpretive act has the common structure of consciousness-of, that is, a 
relation of "reference" to a cultural or material object or topic, which is meant by it in a 
characteristic way.69 In other words, by virtue of performing interpretative acts, those who 
experience hate crime encounter an incident as something both "meant" and "actual." This 
is because consciousness combines consciousness of it (a reference beyond itself towards 
its targeted object or theme) and a relation to the object as something meant (given sense to 
by means of interpretive work).70 Each type of act has its own characteristic way of 
progressively constituting an interpretation of hate crime, and fulfilling its possibilities.71 
   At this deeper level of qualitative analysis, we address the question: how do each of 
these different types of interpretative act operate to "synthesise" (or "constitute") the 
overall sense of an actual or possible hate crime incident in different characteristic ways?72 
Typically, most experiences of hate crime are constituted in their meaningfulness through a 
combination of two or more interpretive acts (or "interpretive performances") acting as 
sources of cognition, including acts of perception, recollection, anticipation, judgment and 
expression. For instance, perception is typically mediated on either side of its temporal 
"here and now" by aspects of recollection, cultural associations and the expectations 
generated by anticipations.73 It is possible to identify relations of dependency and priority 
between these acts, such as between hate crime as recalled and as originally perceived with 
intuitive richness of content. 
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   On reflection, it is clear that an eyewitness' experience of hate crime generated through 
her interpretative acts of perception, then followed by her recollection of these experiences 
to the police and court, is distinctive. It is different in kind from that of those whose 
experience stems only from reading about it, including her trial testimony, but without 
benefiting from the contribution of the intuitive richness characteristic of first-hand 
experiences.74 A victim's original perception may also be supplemented by "intrusive" or 
"unwelcome" recollections, imaginings, anticipations and expressions, each of which, 
through a process of synthesis, sustain the presence and significance of the attack within 
the conscious life of that person as its "legacy." At this "constitutive" level, which 
"explains" the topic in a distinct qualitative sense of this term as the outcome of an 
interpretative sense-constituting performance,75 researchers need to identify and analyse 
the characteristic contributions made by each of these interpretative acts operating both 
singularly and in their various combinations. In this way, we address and seek to answer the 
following question: how is it possible for specific and particular experiences to be 
interpreted as those of hate crime and for this interpretation to arise, take shape, persist and 
fade away within the conscious life of different affected or involved parties?76 
   In addition to posing and answering what-type and how-type questions strictly from 
within the realm of lived experience, we also need to ask "for whom" is there hate crime?77 
Even the most passive and unwanted perception of a hate crime incident arising through 
sheer force of association still involves elements of active interpretation. In turn, these 
appear within the lived experience itself to be the performance of an "interpreter," an 
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ego-subject for whom this incident "takes shape" as exhibiting this or that meaning.78 The 
ongoing interpretative constitution of the inward-facing ego-pole of lived experience 
merits detailed and far reaching phenomenological analysis just much as the 
outward-facing object-pole of such experience.79 
   Here, hate crime researchers can experience the paradox of encountering a type of 
subjectivity which is both a "subject-for" the world around itself, as well as experiencing 
itself as an object for self and others "within" that same surrounding world.80 How does the 
persisting "subject" of lived experience "take shape" within such experience as something 
(or more precisely "someone") constantly being "synthesised" at the spatial, cognitive and 
emotional "centre" of such experience, as both its recipient and interpreter?81 For 
everything held to be valid about hate crime, there is the implicit experience of a 
interpreting subjectivity as the one who is judging and holding it to be valid in a certain 
way, subject perhaps to various qualifications and provisos.82 What is the role of cognitive 
and extra-cognitive interests in both shaping and motivating the selective attention, 
perception and perceptual meaning originally given to hate incidents? How is possible for 
two witnesses occupying an identical physical vantage point to experience "the same" 
incident in quite different ways?83 How does a "sense of self" arise, persist, change and 
fade away within the field of lived experience, whilst the ego itself endures at the centre of 
the flux of such self-experience?84 What is the nature of that 'peculiar temporalisation' by 
which we become enduring egos reconstituting ourselves anew within our modalities of 
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time?85  
   By reflecting upon the depths of experience at the ego-pole, it becomes possible to 
identify and unveil which underlying forms of subjective "orientation," position-taking, 
and "being interested" and "concerned with" this topic are actually in play.86 Here, a 
phenomenology of hate crime needs to ask: How does reflection upon these hidden 
dimensions help reveal aspects of "who we now have become" whenever we interpret this 
topic, which highlight the interpretively reconstructed nature of such subjectivity? What 
role does the continuity of retention of perceptions within memory and their selective 
reactivation play in the performance of the experienced ongoing unity of the living 
"subject" of hate crime experience accomplished through interpretive synthesis of its own 
appearances?87 How is it possible for hate crime victims to remain persistently or 
episodically "in contact" through dialogue with traumatic aspects of the original past 
incident, perhaps over many years?88 On the other hand, victim support agencies may seek 
to effect a cognitive change moving beyond stereotypical notions of "victim" at least in 
how people interpret the past and to break any continually connection with a traumatic past. 
Again, how is this reinterpretation itself possible? How does the subject supply the 
"centred" quality of lived experience as that an identifiable and self-identical "person" 
exhibited over ever-changing phases of "one's own" life experience?  
   Furthermore, there is the question of whether such phenomenological self-reflection can 
highlight our typically latent value-judgments, habitual patterns of interpretation and 
thought, deep-seated prejudices and ideological position-takings of various kinds. These 
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include those stemming from our immersion in the various linguistically carried and 
transmitted cultural traditions and subcultures of modern society?89 In turn, this question 
points to the always already intersubjective character of individual subjectivity: the 
interconnected quality of individual, group and social "worlds" and common sub-worlds of 
culture, together with ongoing cultural traditions to which all individuals variously belong. 
It also highlights the constant and mutual "taking shape" of specific others to whom both 
individual and group identities are routinely ascribed. This represents an interpretive 
process exhibiting particular significance for discriminatory abuse and violence based 
upon such perceived "group identities."90 
   The institutionally coordinated and regulated interpretative performances and 
expressions of victims, police, prosecutors and judges re-constitute not only personal but 
also communal worlds existing as much "for us" as "for me alone."91 These shared 
"life-worlds" take shape and are both sustained and modified as correlations for 
intersubjective syntheses of various kinds performed on the basis of broadly shared 
orientations of interest, concern and values. Self-experience is mediated by a range of 
historically established group categories, including families, ethnicities and - at the most 
general level - that of humanity itself.92 
   In short, after a clarification of various methodological stage and their rationale, it is 
necessary for the study of hate crime to address four questions concerning the what, 
manner of appearance, how and for-whom dimensions of lived experience. Each of these 
levels of analysis must be followed through one at a time within an ever-deepening 
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movement of analysis.93  
   Each of these distinct analytic parts also needs to address both a methodological and an 
applied / substantive element. In other words, the question of what is being experienced by 
respondents as a hate crime first needs to be discussed in general methodological terms of 
how best to formulate appropriate research techniques and questions sufficient, at least in 
principle, to provide optimally satisfying answers to this rich question. This needs to be 
followed by the practical application of these research techniques and modes of 
questioning, resulting in a descriptive analysis of concrete experiences of hate crime. These 
include quotations from a variety of primary sources, such as self-reports from victims, 
witnesses and perpetrators.  
   That sequence of setting out an initial and generalised methodological discussion, 
followed by its practical application leading to a substantive analysis of specific 
experiential data, also needs to be followed by each phase of phenomenological analysis of 
hate crime. Neither methodological discussion, nor applied research, can be development 
fruitfully in isolation from each other. All forms of research, even the most "applied" type, 
rely upon various methodological and philosophical, assumptions. This holds good 
irrespective of whether researchers are aware of these dependencies, or whether they 
acknowledge the underlying premises and taken for granted assumptions that first enable 
their work to proceed as it does.94 Hence, there is, I would suggest, an ethical obligation 
upon researchers to make as "full disclosure" as possible of their underlying 
methodological commitments and guiding presuppositions. This is important to show that 
they are aware of not only the latter's theoretical rationale and contextual appropriateness, 
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but also their limitations both generally and with respect to the particular topic. 
   The upshot of these points concerning the lack of independent self-sufficiency exhibited 
by both methodological discussion and the application of research is that there is a need to 
move between these two levels in a zig-zagging fashion, such that the findings attained at 
each level helps further develop aspects of the other's agenda. In addition, there is a need, at 
the end of each level of analysis, to set out a self-critical conclusion "summing up" both 
what has been achieved to date in terms of clarification of hate crimes as lived, and 
highlighting the still-unfinished business reserved to later stages of phenomenological 
analysis of experience. 
 
Conclusion 
In brief, I would suggest that, as far as a phenomenology of hate crime is concerned, the 
main methodological requirement is for the refinement of an approach to the conduct of 
research that does optimal justice to how this topic is being concretely lived and 
experienced as part of the furniture of our everyday lives. Researchers need a way of 
conducting inquiry that takes such experience and its core structures seriously as a topic for 
analysis in its own right. We need research methods enabling us to describe and unfold the 
following: the intuited contents of such lived-experience; the dynamics involved in its 
underlying interpretive processes; their basic or essential structures; and, finally, the role of 
what appears to be "subjectivities" within such processes.95 
   Hate crime involves discriminatory practices founded on often-unreflective prejudices 
directed against groups in general. Husserl was especially clear that what lies at the heart of 
phenomenological research is a critical analysis questioning those instances of unreflective 
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prejudice and deep-seated presuppositions that pass themselves off as received and 
self-evident wisdom, as what is somehow "obvious" about various minorities.96 Indeed, as 
phenomenological analysis advances through its various stages, there is a continuing and 
deepening refusal to accept anything about hate crime unexamined as "already given" and 
simply taken for granted, which has yet to demonstrate its validity experientially.97 In turn, 
this requires a "back and forth" critical movement between, say, theoretical or official 
"claims" about hate crime contrasted with evidence derived from an adequate 
interpretation of how this topic manifests itself experientially within different forms of life 
or "ego-comportments."98 The very aspiration to provide a "science of phenomena" 
(phenomen-ology) requires exhibiting a commitment to "sifting out" those implicit and 
expression "claims" that cannot withstand critical examination from those that, at least 
provisionally, can gain confirmation based on evidence-based judgments.99 
   At the same, we also need to appreciate the tensions and internal inconsistencies within 
Husserlian phenomenology itself. These include its partial failure to fully integrate the 
centrality of physical embodiment to lived experience into methodological self-reflection. 
Whilst Husserl produced valuable studies of such embodiment, especially in Ideas 11 and 
Cartesian Meditations, 100 it is arguable that the radical implications of these for his 
starting point in self-reflection upon consciousness remained underdeveloped. 
Another difficulty lies in the underdeveloped mode of conducting critique that Husserl’s 
largely descriptive approach applies. Other issues concern the problematic status of appeals 
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to pre-linguistic lived experience, combined with a recognition by the later Husserl that 
life-world experience is constituted against a discursive backgrounds of transmitted 
categories. In addition, there is an undeniable tension between the essentially static quality 
of phenomenology's structural analysis, and the implications of its recognition of the 
streaming flux of lived experience, including the experience of inner time consciousness, 
which entails historical reconstructions of a distinctive form of cultural history. Finally, 
there is the danger that Husserl's appeal to a science of purified experience involves a 
classic enlightenment-style "prejudice against prejudice," which is inconsistent with the 
recognition that a complete suspension of presuppositions is almost certainly impossible. 
In the field of hate crime, a more nuanced and worked through approach to discriminatory 
prejudice and its contestation is surely called for, albeit one that refuses to either ontologise 
or naturalise any particular type of prejudice. 
   Nevertheless, the point remains that the scientific claims of phenomenology depend on 
its optimal freedom from taken for granted prejudices and presuppositions as a regulative 
ideal to which actual studies of hate crime must seek to approximate as far as humanly 
possible. Such discoveries can only be contingent, context specific and reflexively aware 
of their own current limits and debts stemming from the influences of a given and always 
presupposed life-world situation, many of which cannot be fully appreciated or taken into 
account.101 Indeed, the step-by-step analysis progressively uncovering the presence of 
deep-seated prejudices as constitutive of lived experience, including phenomenological 
self-reflection, remains a challenging but still unavoidable theme.102 Rather than dismiss 
phenomenology as a position involving a self-negating "prejudice against prejudice" it is 
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more fruitful to develop its critical ethical and policy dimensions that challenge the specific 
types of prejudicial understandings constitutive of much hate crime, albeit in ways that 
strive to resolve the contradictions just alluded to. 
 
